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Cross-asset regimes · DiversificationEmpirical finding

Stock–bond diversification across changing correlation environments

The measured stock–bond relationship changed sign.

Stock–bond correlation turned from negative to positive in the studied sample. The protection expected from a balanced allocation shrank with it.

Research by Quantitative Markets & Institutions LabRevised 7 sources3 figuresLedger entry

Commit 4806df9Evidence ad24c49Data · 2,892 rowsUniverse 15 instrumentsTests 239 / 239 passed

  • −0.35SPY–TLT 126-day correlation · 2015–2019 average
  • +0.37SPY–TLT 126-day correlation · 2022–2023 peak
  • +0.31SPY–TLT 126-day correlation · sample end
  • ≈0.7Swing from the 2015–2019 average to the 2022–2023 peak
  • 11.6%Portfolio volatility at the observed correlation structure
  • 15.8%Portfolio volatility with every correlation pushed to one

A balanced portfolio's protection depended on a correlation regime that changed sign.

In the frozen sample, 126-day SPY–TLT correlation averaged −0.35 during 2015–2019. It reached +0.37 during 2022–2023 and stood at +0.31 at the sample end. A separate static stress pushed all asset correlations toward one. That raised the studied 60/40-plus-alternatives portfolio's annualized volatility from 11.6% to 15.8%.

SPY–TLT correlation: the insurance that lapsed

rolling 126-day correlation of daily returns · full daily series · notebook 06

Diversification decay under correlation stress

% annualised · λ from 0 (observed) to 1 (all correlations → 1) · notebook 06

Columns of annualised volatility of the 60/40-plus-alternatives portfolio as its correlation matrix is blended toward perfect correlation, rising from 11.6 to 15.8 percent.
correlation stress λportfolio volatility
011.6441
0.0511.8839
0.112.119
0.1512.3496
0.212.576
0.2512.7984
0.313.017
0.3513.232
0.413.4435
0.4513.6518
0.513.8569
0.5514.0591
0.614.2584
0.6514.4549
0.714.6488
0.7514.8402
0.815.0291
0.8515.2157
0.915.4
0.9515.5821
115.7622

Transmission plane · episode marks per activity × inflation quadrant

count of marks · six dated lenses and the 2020–23 trajectory · regime-atlas.html

A two-by-two grid of the atlas transmission plane counting how many documented episode marks the atlas places in each activity and inflation quadrant; placements are schematic readings of each episode's documented axis path, not measured coordinates.
QuadrantAtlas scenario headingMarksEpisode marks
Activity weakening · inflation buildingEarnings and discount-rate pressure can reinforce11965–82 · persistent inflation
Activity strengthening · inflation buildingCash-flow support competes with higher discount rates22021–22 repricing; 2022–23 tightening
Activity weakening · inflation easingEarnings pressure may coexist with room to ease41997–99 · funding reversal; 2007–09 · balance-sheet crisis; 2010–12 · sovereign transmission; 2020 shutdown
Activity strengthening · inflation easingCash-flow support meets less inflation pressure21984–2007 · the long calm; reopening

Published rolling-correlation levels

LevelValueWindow
2015–2019 average-0.3464062015-07-06 – 2019-12-31
2022–2023 peak0.374612022-01-03 – 2023-12-29 (peak 2023-12-04)
Sample end0.3121772026-07-06

Portfolio volatility along the correlation-stress path

λAnnualised volatility
00.116441
0.050.118839
0.10.12119
0.150.123496
0.20.12576
0.250.127984
0.30.13017
0.350.13232
0.40.134435
0.450.136518
0.50.138569
0.550.140591
0.60.142584
0.650.144549
0.70.146488
0.750.148402
0.80.150291
0.850.152157
0.90.154
0.950.155821
10.157622

Volatilities held fixed; correlations blended toward one and the covariance projected back to the PSD cone.

The 60/40-plus-alternatives portfolio

SleeveETFWeight
US equitySPY0.3
US equityQQQ0.1
US equityIWM0.05
International equityEFA0.1
BondsAGG0.2
BondsTLT0.1
AlternativesGLD0.075
AlternativesVNQ0.075

Historical lenses of the Market Regime Atlas

EpisodePeriodQuestionAxis pathInstitutional recordPossible transmissionCompeting explanationsDocumented recordWhat this does not establishSources
United States1965–1982What changes when inflation persists while policy faces conflicting objectives?Inflation pressure broadened and persisted while activity moved through expansions and recessions.Policy frameworks and tolerance for inflation changed; anti-inflation measures intensified under Paul Volcker.Inflation compensation and expected policy can raise nominal yields while higher discount rates weigh on long-duration assets.Monetary, fiscal, energy, productivity, and expectation channels must remain visible together.Federal Reserve historical records describe the Great Inflation as a long, multi-phase period. Monetary policy, fiscal pressure, energy-price shocks, changing frameworks, and political constraints all shaped it. It was not one homogeneous event.No single phase or cause represents the full 1965–1982 interval. The episode does not classify any later market.https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/great-inflation; https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/anti-inflation-measures
Advanced economiesapproximately 1984–2007When can stable conditions make market relationships appear permanent?Output and inflation volatility generally declined relative to the preceding period.Policy became more systematic and communication became more explicit.Long calm samples can make covariance estimates and policy-response assumptions look more stable than their full historical range.Policy, structural change, and luck remain competing and potentially complementary accounts.Federal Reserve History documents lower output and inflation volatility during the Great Moderation. It presents three broad explanations: structural change, smaller shocks, and improved policy.Macroeconomic stability does not prove financial stability or guarantee that fitted relationships will persist.https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/great-moderation
East and Southeast Asia1997–1999How can foreign-currency debt and a reversal of funding reach the real economy?Rapid growth gave way to severe contraction as funding and currency conditions tightened.Responses included liquidity support, guarantees, closures, recapitalization, debt restructuring, and multilateral programs.Currency depreciation can enlarge unhedged foreign-currency liabilities while capital withdrawal constrains credit and market liquidity.Domestic balance sheets, exchange-rate design, supervision, external funding, contagion, and policy sequencing differed by economy.An IMF review records financial and corporate weaknesses, exchange-rate arrangements, rapid credit growth, and unhedged short-term debt. Capital flows reversed, and restructuring paths differed across the affected economies.Thailand, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and the Philippines did not share one mechanism or outcome.https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/op/opfinsec/index.htm
United States and global markets2007–2009What changes when balance-sheet impairment becomes a funding crisis?Economic activity contracted as financial stress spread through funding and credit channels.Responses included discount-window changes, emergency facilities, capital measures, guarantees, rate cuts, and asset purchases.Leverage, collateral declines, maturity transformation, margin calls, and fire sales can connect solvency concerns with impaired liquidity.Housing, underwriting, securitization, leverage, regulation, ratings, funding structure, and policy failures require separate evidence.Official records describe losses on mortgage-related assets, distress across financial firms, and disrupted market functioning. The recession is dated December 2007 to June 2009, and liquidity interventions were extraordinary.Asset-price declines alone do not identify the mechanism. Liquidity support does not resolve insolvency by itself.https://www.govinfo.gov/features/financial-crisis-inquiry-report; https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/great-recession-of-200709
Euro area2010–2012How can institutional architecture change the transmission of sovereign risk?Weak activity and uneven financing conditions interacted across member economies.Common monetary policy operated alongside national fiscal positions, banking systems, and conditional European facilities.Sovereign funding pressure can reach bank balance sheets, collateral, credit supply, and monetary transmission.Bank losses, fiscal positions, growth, external imbalances, institutional design, and redenomination fears varied across countries.The European Central Bank introduced Outright Monetary Transactions in 2012. The stated aims were to safeguard monetary-policy transmission and the singleness of policy. Strict program conditionality was attached.Debt levels alone do not explain the crisis. Member-country experiences cannot be collapsed into one path.https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html
Global economy2020–2023What happens when shutdown, support, reopening, inflation, and tightening occur in sequence?Shutdown contraction, reopening recovery, supply and demand imbalance, inflation repricing, and tightening formed a trajectory rather than one state.Public-health measures, fiscal support, monetary facilities, asset purchases, later rate increases, and balance-sheet reduction occurred in sequence.A non-financial shock can become a cash-flow, supply, inflation, discount-rate, and cross-asset correlation problem at different points.Reopening demand, fiscal and monetary support, supply constraints, energy, labor, expectations, and geopolitical developments require separate tests.The IMF documented the 2020 collapse in activity and extraordinary policy support. The Federal Reserve's June 2022 report later documented elevated inflation, rapid tightening, higher Treasury yields, and lower broad equity prices.Chronology does not identify any single action as the cause of later inflation or the measured stock–bond correlation change.https://www.imf.org/en/publications/weo/issues/2020/04/14/world-economic-outlook-april-2020-the-great-lockdown-49306; https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/2022-06-mpr-part1.htm

Each lens is dated and ex post; lifted verbatim from regime-atlas.html.

Scenario map (dossier): mechanisms to test, not forecasts

Dominant shockPolicy constraintPossible stock channelPossible nominal-bond channel
Disinflationary growth shockRoom to easeLower expected earningsLower yields can support prices
Inflationary supply or policy shockInflation limits easingHigher discount rates and weaker marginsHigher expected rates reduce prices
Fiscal or term-premium shockMore duration must be absorbedTighter financial conditionsHigher risk compensation reduces prices

Audience and decision

Research significance

Multi-asset allocators and enterprise risk teams

The finding matters wherever historical correlations determine risk budgets, hedges, capital allocation, retirement glide paths, or the expected protection of a balanced portfolio.

Decision context

Whether historical diversification deserves to be treated as insurance

Do not size protection from one estimated covariance matrix alone. Ask what happens if the macro driver changes and historically distinct sleeves begin sharing the same loss factor.

Two views expose the same hidden assumption

The first view is historical. A rolling 126-trading-day correlation between SPY and TLT tracked the negative stock–bond relationship of 2015–2019. The same series records its reversal during the 2022–2023 interval. Those values describe this sample. They do not identify the next environment.

The second view is counterfactual. The stress held individual asset volatilities fixed. It then blended the estimated correlation matrix toward perfect positive correlation, repairing the matrix to stay positive semidefinite. At the observed structure the strategic portfolio ran 11.6% annualized volatility. At the perfect-correlation limit it reached 15.8%, the weighted average volatility of its components. About four percentage points of diversification disappeared.

The two views complement each other. History shows that a load-bearing relationship moved. The stress shows the portfolio consequence. Neither claims when or why the endpoint will occur.

Budget for the failure of relationships, not only assets

  • Show portfolio risk across a range of correlation states instead of one point estimate.
  • Identify which pairwise relationship carries most of the diversification benefit.
  • Pair covariance-based risk with named macro scenarios that explain why correlations might change.
  • Monitor rolling relationships without treating the latest window as a forecast of the next regime.
  • Describe “defensive” assets conditionally: protection against one shock may share exposure to another.

Interrogate the portfolio through several non-overlapping lenses

The hedge was conditional on the shock regime

Lab measurement SPY–TLT correlation averaged −0.35 during 2015–2019. A later rolling window reached +0.37 during 2022–2023. Separately, an all-asset correlation stress raised annualized portfolio volatility from 11.6% to 15.8%.

External empirical evidence Federal Reserve and BIS evidence documents elevated inflation, expected tightening, rising Treasury yields, and falling equity prices. Inflation news became more important to stock–bond co-movement after mid-2021.

Interpretive synthesis Nominal duration is protection against particular shocks, not universal portfolio insurance. Inflation can constrain monetary easing and expose both sleeves to a common discount-rate channel.

Causal boundary: the lab measures a sign change and a portfolio stress. It does not attribute the change to one macroeconomic cause or forecast how long the positive relationship will persist.

Examine the diversification regime

Bonds do not protect a portfolio in every kind of downturn.

Bonds do not protect a portfolio in every kind of downturn.

Interpretation

Bonds often help when growth weakens and inflation is contained. They may fall with stocks when inflation keeps interest rates high. The same holds when investors demand more compensation to hold long-term debt.

Decision context

Whether a balanced allocation deserves to be treated as self-hedging, and how much confidence to place in one historical relationship among assets.

Intended analytical use

Multi-asset allocation, risk governance, retirement research, and model validation.

Principal limitation

The lab observes one liquid-ETF history. The synthesis connects that record with external evidence. It does not identify a single cause or forecast the next regime.

Measured correlation sign change

Lab measurement The lab records a clear change in one studied portfolio relationship. A rolling 126-trading-day correlation between SPY and TLT averaged negative during 2015–2019. It turned positive during 2022–2023 and stayed positive to the end of the frozen sample. Separately, an all-asset static stress moved the full correlation matrix toward one. That stress materially raised the studied portfolio's volatility.

Lab measurement

Values produced by the lab's frozen data, declared transformations, tests, and stress design.

External empirical evidence

Measured relationships reported by identified research outside the lab.

Institutional record

Dated policy actions and conditions documented by central banks and international institutions.

Interpretive synthesis

A bounded connection between the measured result, the external record, and an investor decision.

Synthesis ledger

Classification Empirical synthesis of existing investigations; not a seventh executed study.

Measured evidence Frozen SPY–TLT rolling correlation, correlation stress, portfolio evaluation, and historical VaR backtest.

External empirical evidence BIS, peer-reviewed, and Federal Reserve staff research remain distinct from lab estimates.

Institutional record Dated ECB, Federal Reserve, and IMF records establish chronology and stated actions without proving causality.

Data vintage Committed adjusted-close snapshot through 6 July 2026; evidence commit ad24c4999583.

Forecast status None. No present-state classification, regime probability, or return forecast.

Identification limit The observed relationships do not identify inflation, policy, fiscal, liquidity, or geopolitical causes.

Causal boundary Correlation establishes co-movement, not cause. The lab did not identify monetary, fiscal, inflation, growth, liquidity, or geopolitical shocks inside the SPY–TLT series.

Inflation and expected policy as a documented transmission channel

External empirical evidence The negative stock–bond relationship familiar during much of the 2000s was historically unusual rather than timeless. BIS research reports that the correlation between United States equities and government bonds switched sign in mid-2021. Prolonged positive correlations had last appeared in the 1980s and early 1990s.1 ECB evidence documents generally positive correlations from the late 1960s through the late 1990s. Correlations were predominantly negative during the 2000s.2

External empirical evidence One documented mechanism begins with the news that dominates expected policy. When inflation is low and stable, disappointing growth can reduce expected earnings while increasing the likelihood of monetary easing. Stocks fall, yields decline, and bond prices can rise. When high or volatile inflation constrains that response, inflation news can lower nominal bond prices, lift expected rates, and weigh on equities at the same time.

External empirical evidence The June 2022 Federal Reserve Monetary Policy Report records rising Treasury yields amid sustained inflation pressure and expected tightening. Broad equity prices declined sharply. The report also records rapid increases in the federal-funds target range and the start of balance-sheet reduction.3 A later Federal Reserve Board staff working paper studies announcement windows. In those windows, higher-than-expected inflation came with lower stock prices, higher nominal risk-free yields, and higher equity risk premia.4

Scenario map. These are mechanisms to test, not forecasts or guaranteed asset responses.

Dominant shockPolicy constraintPossible stock channelPossible nominal-bond channel
Disinflationary growth shockRoom to easeLower expected earningsLower yields can support prices
Inflationary supply or policy shockInflation limits easingHigher discount rates and weaker marginsHigher expected rates reduce prices
Fiscal or term-premium shockMore duration must be absorbedTighter financial conditionsHigher risk compensation reduces prices

Institutional record The Federal Reserve's historical account of the Great Inflation describes interacting monetary, fiscal, energy-price, and institutional forces rather than one isolated cause.6 The IMF separately documents how greater sovereign-bond supply and central-bank balance-sheet runoff can place more duration with price-sensitive investors. That shift can pressure term premia. The evidence supports the fiscal and market-capacity scenario above. It does not identify the cause of the observed stock–bond reversal.7

Interpretive synthesis A bond hedge is partly an institutional outcome. Inflation credibility, the expected central-bank reaction, fiscal financing, debt supply, and market capacity can influence whether sovereign duration behaves as insurance. The rolling correlation alone identifies none of those channels. Together they form a disciplined scenario set for testing the allocation.

Place this mechanism inside the broader regime framework →

Asset labels do not determine the hedge

Lab measurement Two separate tests establish two narrow facts. The pairwise SPY–TLT relationship changed sign. In a distinct all-asset stress, moving the full correlation matrix toward one raised annualized portfolio volatility from 11.6% to 15.8%. Neither result establishes when another change will occur.

External empirical evidence BIS evidence links the recent positive correlation to an environment where inflation news mattered more for expected monetary policy. Growth-news effects weakened over the same span. Structural research also connects long-run changes in stock–bond co-movement with changes in the inflation–output relationship and time-varying risk premia.5

Interpretive synthesis “Bonds are defensive” is incomplete. Nominal government bonds may hedge disinflationary growth shocks. They can share losses with equities when inflation, expected policy rates, or term premia dominate. A portfolio review should name the shock each defensive sleeve is expected to absorb.

Decision rule Show risk across several correlation states. Pair the covariance matrix with named macroeconomic scenarios, duration exposure, and liquidity assumptions. State which institution is expected to absorb the shock.

Inspect the complete diversification finding →

Fitted relationships were carried into a different observed environment

Lab measurement Maximum-Sharpe optimization fell from about 1.12 in the 2015–2021 fit period to 0.44 in the sealed 2022–2026 evaluation. Risk parity and hierarchical risk parity delivered a more stable realized risk shape but did not establish a reliable return advantage.

External empirical evidence The fit and evaluation windows straddle a documented change in stock–bond correlation and monetary conditions. That chronology matters because every estimated mean and covariance summarizes the sample that produced it.

Interpretive synthesis Precise weights assume that fitted returns and covariances remain useful for the next decision. Here, relationships measured in one observed environment were applied in another. The optimizer itself did not estimate or forecast a policy regime.

Causal boundary The experiment did not identify a regime change as the cause of the performance ranking. It cannot attribute the Sharpe decline to stock–bond correlation alone. Estimation error, concentration, asset selection, and the realized equity path also moved the ranking.

Inspect the portfolio-estimation finding · Analyze allocation sensitivity · Inspect the research record

Exception clusters demand a regime review, not a convenient story

Lab measurement The rolling historical 95% VaR model produced 135 breaches against 107 expected across 2,140 forecasts. Coverage, independence, and conditional-coverage tests all rejected calibration. The exceptions were both too frequent and clustered. The 500-observation reference window changes only as new returns enter it.

External empirical evidence Dated Federal Reserve records and cross-asset research document a sample period in which inflation, policy rates, Treasury yields, equity valuations, and stock–bond correlation changed together.

Interpretive synthesis A breach cluster should trigger a review of the assumed return process, covariance structure, volatility state, and missing scenarios. Increasing the latest risk number without diagnosing the forecast process leaves the failure mechanism unresolved.

Causal boundary The backtests identify frequency error and dependence among exceptions. They do not reveal which return process changed. They also do not identify inflation, policy, correlation reversal, or any other macro factor as the cause. Other windows, weighting schemes, and conditional models require their own validation.

Inspect the VaR finding · Inspect the VaR backtest · Inspect the research record

Research boundary: no present-state classification or forecast

The dossier does not estimate a structural macroeconomic model, identify shocks, or decompose returns into inflation, growth, policy, cash-flow, liquidity, and term-premium components. The external literature supplies credible mechanisms, not a unique explanation for the lab's observations.

Monitoring map. Every proxy is incomplete and should be interpreted with competing explanations.

StatePossible observationsInterpretation risk
InflationLevel, surprises, dispersion, and persistenceA level is not the same as a shock or expectation.
PolicyTarget path, real yields, balance-sheet directionMarket prices mix policy expectations with risk premia.
CorrelationSeveral return frequencies and rolling windowsOverlapping windows are backward-looking and dependent.
Fiscal and market capacityDebt supply, term premium, liquidity, intermediary balance sheetsHigh debt alone does not establish fiscal dominance.
  • Correlation depends on return frequency, bond duration, total-return construction, and window length.
  • Inflation levels, surprises, uncertainty, expectations, and inflation-risk compensation are different variables.
  • Breakeven inflation also contains risk and liquidity premia; it is not a pure expectation.
  • Historical analogies should use data available at the time rather than revised series alone.
  • Portfolio risk depends on weights and volatilities as well as correlation.
  • Political and institutional narratives require explicit alternatives and cannot substitute for identification.

A new empirical investigation would need a declared regime classifier and longer duration-consistent total-return histories. It would also need several defensible windows and real-time macroeconomic vintages. Overlapping estimates would need an uncertainty treatment, and the falsification criterion would be fixed before comparison. Until then, the defensible output is a scenario framework, not a probability assigned to the next regime.

Evidence behind the synthesis

  1. Lombardi, M. J., and V. Sushko (2023), “The Correlation of Equity and Bond Returns,” BIS Quarterly Review, December. BIS research box
  2. Mosk, B., L. Pangallo, and S. M. Zema (2022), “Cross-asset correlations in a more inflationary environment and challenges for diversification strategies,” Financial Stability Review, November. ECB analysis
  3. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2022), Monetary Policy Report, June, part 1. Federal Reserve report
  4. Knox, B., and Y. Timmer (2025), “Stagflationary Stock Returns,” Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2025-056. Federal Reserve research page
  5. Campbell, J. Y., C. Pflueger, and L. M. Viceira (2020), “Macroeconomic Drivers of Bond and Equity Risks,” Journal of Political Economy 128(8), 3148–3185. doi:10.1086/707766
  6. Federal Reserve History (2013), “The Great Inflation.” Historical overview
  7. International Monetary Fund (2025), Global Financial Stability Report, April, chapter 1 on sovereign-bond supply and market functioning. IMF report

Lab evidence and reproduction

Numbers

StatementValueAs statedNote
SPY–TLT 126-day correlation · 2015–2019 average−0.35−0.35
SPY–TLT 126-day correlation · 2022–2023 peak+0.37+0.37
SPY–TLT 126-day correlation · sample end+0.31+0.31
Swing from the 2015–2019 average to the 2022–2023 peak≈0.7≈0.7
Portfolio volatility at the observed correlation structure11.6%11.6%
Portfolio volatility with every correlation pushed to one15.8%15.8%
Portfolio volatility at λ = 0.513.86%13.86%
Percentage points of volatility diversification removes≈4about four percentage points
Weighted-average volatility of the components15.8%15.8%
Rolling window (trading days)126126
First rolling correlation2015-07-06
Last rolling correlation2026-07-066 July 2026
Date of the 2022–2023 peak2023-12-04

Limitations

  • The SPY–TLT result comes from one historical sample and one 126-day rolling-window choice.
  • The stress changes correlations but holds individual volatilities. Real crises can move both.
  • Blending every correlation toward one is deliberately stylized, not a forecast of a specific crisis.
  • The portfolio is one fixed strategic allocation with monthly rebalancing and liquid ETF proxies.
  • The analysis does not establish that positive stock–bond correlation will persist.

Sources

  1. 1Lombardi, M. J., and V. Sushko (2023), “The Correlation of Equity and Bond Returns,” BIS Quarterly Review , December. BIS research box bis.org
  2. 2Mosk, B., L. Pangallo, and S. M. Zema (2022), “Cross-asset correlations in a more inflationary environment and challenges for diversification strategies,” Financial Stability Review , November. ECB analysis ecb.europa.eu
  3. 3Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2022), Monetary Policy Report , June, part 1. Federal Reserve report federalreserve.gov
  4. 4Knox, B., and Y. Timmer (2025), “Stagflationary Stock Returns,” Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2025-056. Federal Reserve research page federalreserve.gov
  5. 5Campbell, J. Y., C. Pflueger, and L. M. Viceira (2020), “Macroeconomic Drivers of Bond and Equity Risks,” Journal of Political Economy 128(8), 3148–3185. doi:10.1086/707766
  6. 6Federal Reserve History (2013), “The Great Inflation.” Historical overview federalreservehistory.org
  7. 7International Monetary Fund (2025), Global Financial Stability Report , April, chapter 1 on sovereign-bond supply and market functioning. IMF report imf.org

Cite this

Wisniewski, K. (2026, August 8). Stock–bond diversification across changing correlation environments. Quantitative Markets & Institutions Lab. https://www.kylewisniewski.com/lab/stock-bond-regimes

@misc{wisniewski2026stock,
  author = {Wisniewski, Kyle},
  title = {Stock–bond diversification across changing correlation environments},
  year = {2026},
  month = {aug},
  howpublished = {\url{https://www.kylewisniewski.com/lab/stock-bond-regimes}},
  note = {Empirical finding · Quantitative Markets & Institutions Lab · commit 4806df9}
}